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NOTES

NEW YORK STATE OF MIND:
RAPE AND MENS REA
NICOLE FUSILLIt

INTRODUCTION

At 8:30 p.m. on November 22, 1996, Oliver Jovanovic, a
Columbia University graduate student and a Barnard
undergraduate student ("Jane") finally met face-to-face after a
few months of conversing on-line and through e-mails. 1 Their
conversations were quite personal and graphic, delving into the

world of sadomasochism ("S/M") and snuff films. 2 Oliver called
Jane at 3 a.m. on November 22nd, and they spoke for
approximately four hours. 3 After Oliver invited Jane to see a
movie with him that night, Jane gave Oliver the address of her
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; M.S., Aug.
2000, Dowling College; B.A., Jan. 1997, Binghamton University.
1 People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159-61 (1st Dep't 1999).
2 Id. at 160. Snuff films are films in which a person is killed. Id. Their first
encounter began when Jane received an "instant message" from Oliver. From the
start their conversations became intimate as the two realized their common
interests. Id. at 159-60. They both had an interest in the grotesque, the bizarre, and
in snuff films, and Jane expressed an interest in making such a film herself. Id.
Jane graphically described how her love interest, Luke, was raped when be was a
young boy: "(S]o young man took young boy (like) [sic] to empty hotel room, tied him
to bed, straddled his ass, knife to throat, no protection, come in all the way and
make it good... made it good." Id. at 163-64. Jane explained that this made her
perk up because she was thinking about a plot for a snuff film. Id. at 164. Jane went
on to explain that Luke was a sadomasochist and she was his slave: "[Ilts [sic]
painful, but the fun of telling my friends 'hey I'm a sadomasochist' more than
outweighs the torment." Id. at 164. When Oliver expressed an interest in the world
of S/M, Jane added: "I'm what those happy pain fiends at the Vault call a 'pushy
bottom.'" Id. The court explained that a "'pushy bottom' is a submissive partner
who pushes the dominant partner to inflict greater pain." Id. at n.4.
3 Id. at 161.
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dormitory. On the evening of the 22nd, they met for dinner and
then went to Oliver's apartment to watch a movie.4 At his
apartment, Oliver gave Jane some tea, which she found to have a
chemical taste, then they looked at a book of photographs
depicting corpses placed in grotesque poses, and watched a
sexually violent video. 5 After talking about various topics, Oliver
and Jane engaged in S/M activities, which included Oliver tying
Jane to a futon frame, pouring hot wax on her, and sodomizing
6
her.
Jane left Oliver's apartment on the evening of November
23rd and returned to her dormitory where she fell asleep,
showered, and then went to Luke's apartment. She told Luke
that she had been tied up, sodomized, and burned by Oliver.7 On
Sunday, November 24th, Jane received an e-mail sent by Oliver
informing her that she had left her gold chain at his apartment.,
The next day Jane responded that she was "'purged by
emotions, and pain,' and that she was 'quite bruised mentally
and physically, but never been so happy to be alive.'-9 They
continued communicating over the Internet later that day.
Oliver claimed that the encounter was consensual; Jane insisted
she was an unwilling participant. 10
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 161-62.
7 Id. at 162-63.
8 Id. at 163. In addition, Oliver said, "'I have a feeling the experience may not
have done you as much good as I'd hoped, because you weren't acting much smarter
at the end than you were at the beginning.' "Id.
9 Id. In the same e-mail she told Oliver that "'Burroughs best sums up my
state... the taste is so overpoweringly delicious, and at the same time, quite
nauseating.' "Id.
10 See id. at 159. Jane testified that when she said to Oliver, "'[D]on't rape me,
don't dismember me, don't kill me', " he responded by asking, "'[I]s there anything
else you don't want me to do?' She said, '[Yles, don't do anything you can get
arrested for'" and that he was going to have to kill her if he did not want to get
arrested. Id. at 162.
Oliver Jovanovic was convicted after a jury trial of kidnapping in the first
degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and assault in the first degree. Id. at 159.
The trial court excluded a number of the e-mail messages between Jane and Oliver
pursuant to New York's Rape Shield Law. Id. After reviewing all of the testimony
and redacted e-mails, however, the appellate court concluded that the e-mails
should not have been excluded by the Rape Shield Law. Id. at 167. The court
reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 172-73. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed in a two sentence opinion. See People v. Jovanovic, 735 N.E.2d
1284, 1284 (N.Y. 2000) (explaining that the reversal was based on CPL section
60.42(5), "interests of justice" exception to the Rape Shield Law). For a year and a
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On August 15, 1973, three members of the Royal Air Force
of England accompanied William Anthony Morgan, a superior
officer, back to his house to have sex with his wife. 1 On the ride
to Morgan's house, Morgan provided the men with
contraceptives and told them that while his wife was "kinky" and
needed to resist and struggle during intercourse to get "turned
on," she would welcome sexual intercourse with them. 12 When
the four men arrived at the Morgan home, Mrs. Morgan was
sleeping in a room with her eleven-year-old son. Mrs. Morgan
was awoken, dragged into another room, and while the men took
turns holding her limbs, they had sexual intercourse with her.13
From the moment Mrs. Morgan was forced out of bed, she
screamed for her sons to call the police. She only stopped when
the defendants covered her face, pinched her nose, and she could
no longer breathe. 14 Mrs. Morgan went directly to a hospital and
told the staff she was raped. After the defendants were arrested,
they gave statements to the police, corroborating Mrs. Morgan's
story. At trial, however, the defendants claimed that although
there was some degree of force at the beginning of the encounter,
Mrs. Morgan became an active participant when they took her to
5
the second room.'
half, the New York County District Attorney's Office announced that it would retry
Jovanovic for the crimes. See Kenneth Lovett et al., Cybersex Ollie Now Faced with
New Trial, N.Y. POST, July 7, 2000, at 2. On Nov. 1, 2001, all charges were
dismissed against Oliver Jovanovic because the complainant was emotionally
unable to testify in a second trial. See Jane Fritsch & Katherine E. Finkelstein,
Charges Dismissed in Columbia Sexual Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, November 2,
2001, at D1.
11Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, 2 All E.R. 347, 355 (H.L. 1975). The men
had been out drinking together, and when they could not find some women in town,
Morgan suggested that they all go to his home to have sexual intercourse with his
wife. Id. Morgan did not know the three men before that evening. Id. at 369.
12 Id. at 355, 369. While the three defendants testified to this chain of events,
Morgan denied that he told the men that his wife was going to struggle to get
turned on. Id. at 355.
13 Id. at 354. Mrs. Morgan was sleeping in a single bed so the defendants held
her arms and legs apart and dragged her to a room occupied by a double bed. Id.
The men had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Morgan and performed "lewd acts on
various parts of her body." Id.
14 Id. She first told the younger boy, who was in the same bedroom, to call the
police and later she screamed to her older son to do the same. Id.
15 Id. at 355. In addition, the defendants argued that if Mrs. Morgan did not
actually consent, they mistakenly believed that she did based on what Mr. Morgan
had told them on the ride to the house. Id.
The defendants were convicted of rape after a jury trial but appealed. The court
of appeals certified a question to the House of Lords to determine "whether a
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One of the purposes underlying the laws surrounding sexual
offenses is the fact that people treasure their sexual autonomy. 16
This includes the right to engage in any type of sexual
17
relationship, as well as the right to refrain from sexual contact.
While the crime of rape touches upon one of the most precious
rights known to a human, the law surrounding the offense is
unsettled.' 8 Each state's statutory definition of rape varies
considerably, but typically it is a crime to forcibly compel, either
by threat or physical force, an unwilling participant to have
sexual intercourse. 19 The law not only differs significantly from
state to state, but it is quite unsettled within the states,
resulting in decisions that do not clearly delineate the
20
parameters of the offense.
defendant's unreasonable belief in consent to sexual intercourse could act to acquit
him." Dolly F. Alexander, Comment, Twenty Years of Morgan: A Criticism of the
Subjectivist View of Mens Rea and Rape in Great Britain, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 207,
222 (1995). The House of Lords held that both an unreasonable and reasonable
mistake of fact were a defense to rape. The convictions, however, were upheld on the
grounds that a threshold requirement was not met, or in other words, the
defendants could not have honestly believed that Mrs. Morgan consented. Morgan, 2
All E.R. at 353.
16 See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF

INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 17 (1998) (explaining that both criminal
and civil laws safeguard rights to "sexual self-determination").
17 See id. (exploring the different standards that apply to sexual behavior of
males and females when seeking casual sex versus long-term relationships).
18 See id. (noting that sexual offense laws "remain incomplete despite decades
of effort and countless legal reforms").
19 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.01, at 570 (3d
ed. 2001) (giving as an example Maryland's statute which defines rape to be sexual
intercourse "[b]y force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of
the other person"); Brain Kennan, Evolutionary Biology and Strict Liability for
Rape, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 131, 137-38 (1998) (noting that American rape
statutes typically include "(1) sexual intercourse which includes penetration, (2)
achieved forcibly, (3) against the will of or without the consent of the woman").
20 See generally Craig T. Byrnes, Note, Putting the Focus Where it Belongs:
Mens Rea, Consent, Force, and the Crime of Rape, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 277,
278, 281 (1998) (opining that the law of rape is in "shambles" and "produces results
that cannot be reconciled with one another").
Four cases illustrate this point clearly-two interstate cases and two intrastate
cases. In an unreported case in Florida, a defendant was acquitted despite evidence
that he held his victim at knifepoint while raping her. See Jury: Woman in Rape
Case "Asked for it," CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1989, at 11. The jury foreman stated, "We felt
she (the woman) asked for it the way she was dressed .... She was advertising for
sex." Id. The jury based its determination that the defendant believed that the act
was consensual on the way in which the victim was dressed.
In a case in California, however, the defendant's conviction was ultimately
affirmed based on the victim's desires, not the defendant's beliefs. See People v.
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New York separates its sex offenses into degrees. 21 Rape in
the first degree is governed .by New York Penal Law section
130.35.22 It is apparent from reading the New York statute that
the actus reus 23 element is forcible compulsion, however, no
mens rea 24 element appears in the statute. While there is much
25
wvritten about the forcible compulsion component of the statute,
Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 123-24 (Cal. 1986). The court did not examine the
defendant's beliefs but focused exclusively on the fact that the victim felt threatened
by the defendant's statements and actions, including his "displaying the muscles in
his arms," "lecturing her," and "look[ing] at her 'funny.' "Id. at 112. These opposing
approaches to rape law send mixed messages both to potential victims and to
potential defendants.
Two decisions, People v. Benard, 360 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), and
People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), both handed down by the
Michigan Court of Appeals only two years apart, demonstrate the confusion that
exists concerning rape law even within a single jurisdiction. In Jansson, the victim
accompanied the defendant, whom she was just introduced to by a mutual friend, to
his office so that she could apply for a job. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d at 511. Once at his
office, the defendant stated that he wanted to have intercourse with her. Id. The
victim refused, but when the defendant grabbed her, pulled her to the floor, and
undressed her, she reluctantly submitted to sexual intercourse because she did not
know what else to do. Id. The court, interpreting the statute very broadly, upheld a
conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on a showing of force or
coercion sufficient to overcome the victim. Id. at 513.
In Benard, another case of criminal sexual conduct, the Michigan Court of
Appeals interpreted the same statute very narrowly. The victim in Benard was
raped at gunpoint, but the rape was committed by the defendant while his
accomplice held the gun. Benard, 360 N.W.2d at 205. The court held that the
weapon must actually be in the hands of the person committing the sexual act to
constitute first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. The court found itself
interpreting different provisions of the same statute contrarily. See SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE 90 (1987) (noting that the Michigan cases prove that interpretation is
the key to rape law).
21 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, .30, .35 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2002).
22 Id. § 130.35 (McKinney Supp. 2002). The statute provides: "A person is guilty
of rape in the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with
another person: 1. By forcible compulsion ..." Id.
23 See DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 9.01, at 81 (defining actus reus as "a
voluntary act.., that causes ...

social harm").

See id. § 10.02[C], at 117 ("'[Tlhe particular mental state provided for in the
definition of an offense.' ").
25 See generally Kit Kinports, Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 760 (2001) (expressing surprise that so little attention has
been given to the mens rea element since it is generally assumed in criminal law
that the mens rea term attaches to every material element of the crime). This
neglect of mens rea in rape is not surprising considering that most modern statutes
are a codification of the common law offense, which focused on the force
requirement and not the defendant's state of mind. See generally SCHULHOFER,
supra note 16, at 18 (commenting that most American rape statutes are a
codification of Blackstone's definition).
24
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the issue of mens rea is relatively unexplored and hence, quite
unsettled. In 1993, in People v. Williams, 26 the New York Court
of Appeals stated that although the statute is silent on the issue,
"intent is implicitly an element" of the crime. 27 Expounding
upon this, the court held that the intent requirement is the
"intent to forcibly compel another to engage in intercourse or
sodomy." 28 The Williams court, however, did not explain its
reasoning when it declared that the mens rea for rape is intent,
nor has any other court of appeals decision offered any guidance
29
on the issue.
This Note proposes that while a mens rea element written
into the statute defining the offense of rape is necessary, there
should also be a reasonable mistake of fact defense. The statute
should expressly allow the defendant to raise the defense of a
reasonable mistake as to the victim's willingness, thereby
negating the mens rea. New York courts need to focus their
attention on the culpable mental state of the defendant and not
on the victim. While it is important to reduce sexual assaults,
there are countervailing interests. The rape statute in New York
should be designed to produce successful convictions when the
defendant had the requisite state of mind to commit the crime,
not just when there was force used. In addition, a clear
distinction needs to be drawn between the actus reus element,
forcible compulsion, and the mens rea element. This Note
concludes that the New York statute for rape should be revised
to explicitly include a mens rea element of negligence, with an
explanation that a reasonable mistake of fact 30 is a defense to
the crime.
Part I of this Note traces the evolution of the law of rape
from the common law to present day, detailing both statutes and
courts' interpretations of such statutes. Part I also provides a
detailed look at the history of rape law reform and the
application of rape statutes in various jurisdictions. Part II of
this note focuses on rape law in New York State. In discussing a
26
27
28
29

614 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1993).
Id. at 736.

Id.

See id. (stating, without elaborating, that "intent is implicitly an element of
[rape]").
30 DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 12.01, at 151 (defining a mistake of fact as being
"either unaware of, or mistaken about, a fact pertaining to an element of [an]
offense"); see also id. § 12.02, at 152.
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number of important New York cases, Part II explains the
current rape statute and how it is applied by courts and explores
the problems with the current interpretation of the offense of
rape. Part III proposes a revised statute for rape in the first
degree, including both mens rea and actus reus elements.
Finally, it applies the statute to the factual scenarios set forth at
the beginning of this Note and examines the effects of focusing
on the defendant's state of mind rather than on the victim's
conduct.
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF RAPE

A.

Common Law Definition
At common law, rape was a general intent crime. 31 Criminal
responsibility was based on the actus reus performed with a
culpable state of mind;32 no specific mens rea element needed to
be shown. Blackstone defined rape as "carnal knowledge of a
woman forcibly and against her will."33
Additional
31DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 33.01, at 569. At common law, the distinction
between specific intent and general intent carried more meaning than it does today.
Id. § 10.06, at 136. Historically, it was common for a statute not to contain a mens
rea term. Id. Therefore, "general intent" referred to any offense for which only a
blameworthy state of mind was required and "specific intent" was reserved for
offenses that expressly required proof of a particular mental state. Id. Today,
however, most criminal statutes expressly include a mens rea term rendering the
distinction more difficult to express and understand. Id.
Although the distinction between general and specific intent crimes can take on
several different meanings depending on the jurisdiction, for the Model Penal Code
(MPC) and states that structured their statutes similarly to the MPC, the
distinction no longer exists. See id. § 10.07[A], at 137-38. New York follows the
MPC's "elemental" approach to mens rea. Thus, a person may not be convicted
solely because he acted with a general moral blameworthiness; he must have acted
either intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 15.15(1) (McKinney 1998); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19,

§ 10.07[A], at 138 (noting that the MPC uses the mens rea terms purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently). The departure from the common law scheme
has rendered the distinction between specific intent and general intent irrelevant.
See id. at 136-38.
32 DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 10.06, at 136.
334 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210. This definition was
interpreted to mean that only a woman could be a victim of rape, with the exception
that a married woman could not be raped by her husband. SCHULHOFER, supra note
16, at 18. This aspect of the law of rape was based on a.seventeenth century notion
of consent expressed by British Chief Justice Lord Hale: "by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract." 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF
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requirements, that the victim report the incident promptly,
corroboration of the victim's story, and utmost resistance,
heightened the proof necessary for a conviction.3 4 Generally, a
conviction rested on the last of these requirements: how well the
35
woman conveyed her unwillingness to engage in intercourse.
As a result, force and consent were defined in relation to the
resistance offered by the woman, and sufficiency of such
resistance was determined by a male judge. 36 Underlying the
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (P. R. Glazebrooke ed., London Professional Books
Ltd. 1971) (1736). Another rationale was found in notions of property. A woman was
considered the property of her father and, when she married, the husband took over
for the father, thereby inheriting the ownership rights over his wife. See DRESSLER,
supra note 19, § 33.03[A) [1], at 573 (noting that based upon the property rationale
a husband possessed unlimited rights over his wife, including sexual access). New
York was one of the first states to abolish the marital exception. See People v.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984). Further, the current New York statute
has also abolished the gender distinction; the victim can be male or female. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney Supp. 2002).
34 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 18-19 (explaining that these strict rules
were to guard against false accusations); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 317, 318-19 (2000) (noting that the corroboration requirement and
other evidentiary rules reflected male judges' skepticism towards accusations of
rape); see also RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO
AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 5-6 (1996) (listing the marital exception, the corroboration
requirement, and the utmost resistance requirement as the most criticized aspects
of rape law).
35 See DRESSLER, supranote 19, § 33.04[C], at 580-82.
36 See ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 31-32, 82 (discussing the history of the
definition of rape as it was developed in a male dominated field with the "imposition
of male standards of conduct"); see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 19 (noting
that the requirement of utmost resistance intensified during the 20th century).
There are a number of cases throughout history that illustrate the distrust
embedded in the law surrounding rape, requiring women to resist until the offense
is consummated or be thought of as voluntarily consenting. In 1889, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska reversed a rape conviction, holding that "[i]f the carnal
knowledge was with the voluntary consent of the woman, no matter how tardily
given, or how much force had theretofore been employed, it is not rape." Reynolds v.
State, 42 N.W. 903, 903 (Neb. 1889). Over half a century later, Nebraska courts
continued to quote the same language and uphold the same principles. See, e.g.,
Cascio v. State, 25 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Neb. 1947) (reversing a conviction because
submission constituted consent "no matter how reluctantly yielded").
Some of the clearest examples of the traditional male judge viewpoint on this
issue come from the state of Wisconsin. In 1880, the judges on the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin did not believe that use of a gun was a sufficient threat of personal
violence. Whittaker v. State, 7 N.W. 431, 431 (Wis. 1880). Being held down at-the
hands and feet, the victim screamed for help numerous times. Id. The defendant
then threatened to use his revolver if she cried for help again, but the woman still
tried once more. Id. Finally, physically exhausted, she was no longer able to fight
and reluctantly gave up. Id. While this was more than enough evidence to convince
a jury to convict, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin felt differently. Id. at 433.
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requirements to prove rape was the general distrust of such
37
accusations.
B.

History of Rape Law Reform

Common law requirements and interpretations had a direct
impact on the codification of rape law, thereby continuing the
difficulty in obtaining rape convictions. 38 In the 1950s, however,
the American Law Institute (ALI) recognized the low rate, of
conviction in rape cases and proposed the Model Penal Code
(MPC) to deal with the problems associated with rape law. 39 The
ALI identified three major defects 40 and made the following
proposals to rectify each problem: eliminate the resistance
requirement; abolish any mention of victim consent; and divide
rape into two separate offenses-stranger rape and acquaintance

Similarly, in Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906), a jury found the
defendant guilty of rape, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed because the
victim had not adequately demonstrated her lack of consent. Id. at 539. The victim

was a sixteen-year-old virgin on her way to her grandmother's home. The defendant
seized her, tripped her to the ground, and forced himself upon her. The victim
screamed and struggled until the defendant put his hand over her mouth. Whenever
he removed his hand from her mouth she began screaming again. The court
concluded: "Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but
there must be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within
the woman's power to resist the penetration of her person, and this must be shown
to persist until the offense is consummated." Id. at 538.
37 See supra note 20; see also 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 924(a), at 737 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (proposing that "[n]o judge
should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's
social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a
qualified physician"). Wigmore's distrust of rape complainants stemmed from the
view that they suffered from a mental defect and that the real victim was the man.
Id. at 736.
38 See Byrnes, supra note 20, at 278 (commenting that the impact of the
common law offence of rape on current statutes has exacerbated the problems
surrounding modem rape law); see also Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376,
379-80 (1870) (noting that the first rape statute codified in Massachusetts in 1642
retained the description of the common law offense).
39 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 20; see also Christina E. Wells & Erin
Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of
Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 146 n.80 (2001) (discussing two 1973
studies finding that men had between a two and thirteen percent chance of being
convicted of rape).
40 The ALI attributed the problems in the law to the resistance requirement,
the focus on victim consent, and the inclusion of a number of diverse kinds of
misconduct carrying with them severe punishments. See SCHULHOFER, supra note
16, at 20.
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rape-with distinct penalty levels. 41 The theory behind the
proposals was that if consent was removed as an issue, juries
42
would focus on the actions of the defendant and not the victim.
In an attempt to facilitate this, the MPC departed from the
common law by eliminating the resistance requirement and
43
making forcible compulsion the main component of the offense.
The MPC provided a framework from which many states
structured their statutes, especially adhering to the forcible
compulsion component. 44 Thus, despite widespread rape law
reforms, the fixation on the actus reus-specifically physical
force-continued. 45 Following the lead of the ALI, some states
used the forcible compulsion element to minimize the need to
show resistance. 46 A majority of states, however, ignored the
ALI's proposal to completely eliminate the resistance
41 See id. at 20-21 (pointing out that the reformers did not diverge from
traditional assumptions in that they preserved the prompt complaint and
corroboration requirements, but did attempt to make rape prosecutions more
effective).
42 Id. at 22.
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see SCHULHOFER,
supra note 16, at 23 (noting that the MPC implemented the stringent requirement
of forcible compulsion but failed to define the term).
44 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 23 (describing the ALI's influence on
rape law reform throughout the country); POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 34, at 6
(noting that most states followed the lead of the Michigan statute, the New York
statute, or the MPC in reforming their rape statutes).
45 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 24 (criticizing the ALI's reinforcement of
the physical violence requirement to successfully prove rape); POSNER & SILBAUGH,
supra note 34, at 6 (concluding that the MPC's emphasis on outward manifestations
of nonconsent resembles the common law utmost resistance requirement).
46 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie Supp.
2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35
(McKinney Supp. 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.040 (West 2000). These states defined "forcible compulsion" to be either
physical force upon the victim or an express or implied threat of physical force upon
the victim, and in some states, upon others. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-101 (Michie Supp. 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010 (Michie
Supp. 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00 (McKinney Supp. 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.305 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010 (West 2000). Due to the dual
meaning of "forcible compulsion," courts did not require victim resistance, especially
when it was futile or the victim feared physical injury. See Ayers v. State, 594 So. 2d
719, 720 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that the second definition of forcible
compulsion-a threat of serious physical injury-did not require the victim to
continue resisting); State v. Spencer, 50 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating, "the law does not require or expect the utmost resistance to sexual assault
when it appears that such resistance would be futile or would provoke more serious
injury"); State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("Resistance
never comes into play where a threat (constructive force) is employed.").
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requirement4 7 and heightened the corroboration and prompt
reporting requirements, making it more difficult to obtain rape
convictions. 48 In reality, the change was mostly semantic in that
judges continued to use resistance to gauge the existence and
extent of force. 49
As a result, physical force remained
intertwined with the victim's resistance, with a slight shift in
case law and statutes in defining sufficient resistance.50
47 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 24.
48 See id. at 26-27 (noting that the corroboration requirement became so
restrictive that in a typical year in the early 1970s in New York, thousands of rape
complaints were filed resulting in only eighteen convictions).
Many courts went so far as to require some type of medical corroboration before
they would convict. See id. In the 1973 case United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547
(D.C. Cir. 1973), a twelve-year old girl testified that while visiting a friend two men
grabbed her by the legs, dragged her into a bedroom, closed the door, put a dresser
in front of it, pulled her clothes off, and raped her. As soon as she was freed, she ran
out of the apartment, without her coat, and called the police. Id. at 548. Police
testified that they observed that the victim was crying, her clothing was disheveled,
and she was not wearing a coat on a cold day. Id. at 549. Wiley was convicted of
rape and appealed. Id. at 550. Although the court admitted that the police officers'
testimony and the prompt report of the incident corroborated the victim's claims, it
reversed the conviction because the doctor who examined the victim was not
subpoenaed to corroborate the sexual intercourse (the doctor had been subpoenaed
on three prior dates set for trial but was on vacation on the fourth date). Id. at 551;
see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 26. This case was decided in what was
considered "one of the nation's most progressive courts" at the time. Id.
49 See Bryden, supra note 34, at 358 ("[Slince the Code's definition of rape
clearly requires that the compulsion be by force or a threat of force ...[and] [aln
acquaintance rapist usually does not employ force unless his victim resists ...the
MPC did not abolish the resistance requirement.").
A typical example of this resistance rationale is found in a 1973 New York case,
People v. Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240 (3d Dep't 1973). The victim testified that she
submitted without resisting or crying out because the defendant threatened her
with a box cutter. Id. at 241. Subsequently, the victim got the weapon away from
the defendant and threw it out the window, but submitted to intercourse again
because he pulled her hair, choked her, and told her that he could kill her. Id. Based
upon this testimony, the jury convicted the defendant of rape, yet the appellate
division reversed. Id. at 242-43. The court focused on the sufficiency of the victim's
resistance to satisfy the forcible compulsion requirement, thereby concluding that
rape "is not committed unless the woman opposes the man to the utmost limit of her
power. The resistance must be genuine and active." Id. at 242.
50 In 1965, New York enacted a rape statute requiring "earnest resistance."
SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 24. "Forcible compulsion"-the requisite actus reus
of first degree rape-was defined as "physical force that overcomes earnest
resistance" or threat of "immediate death or serious physical injury." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney 1965). To alleviate concerns about the stringent
statutory requirement New York revised the statute in a 1977 amendment, defining
.earnest resistance" as: "resistance of a type reasonably expected from a person who
genuinely refuses to participate in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or
sexual contact, under all the attendant circumstances. Earnest resistance does not
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C.

Resistance Remains Rooted in Rape Law
It was apparent that the rape reform spurred by the ALI
had not increased rape convictions.
In response, a new
generation of reformers directed their efforts towards
eliminating the restrictive rules of evidence and the resistance
requirement. 51 Scholars, and even some courts, began to
recognize that women respond to sexual assault differentlysome with "active resistance" and others with a "numbing fear"
causing them to "freeze." 52 Legislators responded by decreasing
the utmost resistance requirement to reasonable resistance 53 or

mean utmost resistance." SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 340 (6th ed. 1994).
51 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 25-29 (discussing the work of various

scholars whose work throughout the 1970s sought to enlighten society about the
plight that faced a victim of rape); Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable
Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 2687, 2692 (1991) ("Elimination of the physical
resistance requirement has been one of the most important goals of rape law
reform .... ).
52 People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118-19 (Cal. 1986); see DRESSLER, supra note
19, § 33.04[21, at 580-81; Berliner, supra note 51, at 2692. The Barnes court cited a
number of studies conducted in the 1970s, indicating that while resistance may be
probative in establishing force, its absence is not dispositive of consent. Barnes, 721
P.2d at 118-19. In addition, the court recognized that resistance to sexual assault
places the victim at a greater risk of injury. Id. at 119; see also DRESSLER, supra
note 19, §33.04[21, at 581 ("[Sjubstantial resistance increases the risk of aggravated
injury to the female confronting a determined rapist."); cf LINDA BROOKOVER
BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 53-54 (1989) (reviewing research on prevalence and
effects of resistance). But see Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape
Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 981 (1998) (rejecting the myth that women who
physically resist their attackers are at a greater risk of being raped and seriously
injured, because more than four out of five women who protected themselves in a
rape attack prevented the rape from being completed); Bryden, supra note 34, at
365-66 (pointing out that the studies concluding that resistance is dangerous are
not convincing because stranger rapes are over-represented in such studies).
53 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 30 (noting that the great majority of
states softened their resistance requirements considerably); Bryden, supra note 34,
at 358-59 (concluding that although most rape statutes do not mention resistance,
courts still require more force than is necessary to have intercourse, and therefore,
the standard is reasonable resistance). Some examples of such statutes are: DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)(1) (2001), which requires reasonable resistance under
the circumstances to communicate nonconsent; IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(3) (Michie
Supp. 2002), which states, "Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by
force or violence..."; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42, 14:42.1 (West Supp. 2002),
which provides that aggravated rape requires utmost resistance but forcible rape
requires only force or threats of physical violence that make resistance useless; and
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010 (West Supp. 2002), which explains that forcible
compulsion requires physical force that overcomes resistance.
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eliminating it altogether. 54 In addition, rape shield laws were
enacted, which protected a rape victim by limiting the scope of
admissible evidence regarding a victim's past sexual history. 55
Despite these accomplishments, judges continued to use
resistance as a yardstick in evaluating force,56 preventing many
54 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 30 (acknowledging that while it is a

minority position, some states eliminated the resistance requirement from their
statutes); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087,

1123-24 (1986)

(commenting that the requirements that the victim resist to the "utmost" and
continuously until penetration have now been universally repealed).
While some states amended their statutes to remove the word resistance, see,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00 (McKinney Supp. 2002), other states affirmatively
stated that women need not use resistance. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5 (West
Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(2) (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5511(5) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(a) (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(c) (Anderson 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-12 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 3254(1) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (Michie 1996).
55See Angela P. Harris & Lois Pineau, A Dialogue on Evidence, in DATE RAPE
109, 121-23 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996) (explaining the different types of rape shield
laws).
New York rape shield laws are premised on the theory that a victim's chastity,
or lack thereof, generally is irrelevant to a rape prosecution. See People v.
Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 165 (1st Dep't 1999). The statute provides that:
Evidence of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible ...unless
such evidence:
1. proves or tends to prove specific instances of the victim's prior sexual
conduct with the accused; or
2. proves or tends to prove that the victim has been convicted of
[prostitution] ...within three years prior to the sex offense which is the
subject of the prosecution; or
3. rebuts evidence introduced by the people of the victim's failure to engage
in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact during a
given period of time; or
4. rebuts evidence introduced by the people which proves or tends to prove
that the accused is the cause of pregnancy or disease of the victim, or the
source of semen found in the victim; or
5. is determined by the court after an offer of proof by the accused outside
the hearing of the jury.. . to be relevant and admissible in the interests of
justice.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992). While the "interests of justice"
exception seems to be used infrequently, see Leslie Francis, Introduction, in DATE
RAPE, supra, at vii, ix (characterizing the New York "interests of justice" exception
as infrequently used), that is exactly what the Jovanovic court relied on to reverse
the defendant's conviction. See Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
56 See Berliner, supra note 51, at 2692, 2702 (noting the failure of statutory
revision to affect courts, especially when the defendant asserted the defense of
reasonable belief of consent); see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 33 (describing
major reforms that had "surprisingly little practical effect")..
One of the few exceptions to the force-resistance rationale is found in New
Jersey. See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). In M.T.S., the defendant
was staying with the victim, a fifteen-year-old girl, and her family. Id. at 1267. The
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rapes from meeting the threshold requirements necessary to
sustain a conviction.57
While the legislatures changed the
wording of the statutes, they could not change societal attitudes
concerning rape.
Two cases decided in the 1980s, State v. Alston 58 and State v.
Rusk,5 9 illustrate the prevalence of the traditional resistance
rationale despite statutory reforms. In Rusk, the victim, Pat,
was at a Baltimore bar with a friend, Terry, when she met the
defendant. Rusk asked Pat for a ride to his apartment as she
was getting ready to leave. Thinking that Terry knew Rusk, Pat
agreed but cautioned Rusk that this was just a ride home, "as a
friend" and not to be thought of as anything more. 60 When they
arrived, Pat declined Rusk's invitation to come inside twice. He
then reached over, turned off the ignition, and took her car
keys. 6 1 Completely unfamiliar with the area, Pat testified that
she followed Rusk up to his apartment out of fear.
Once inside the apartment, Rusk told Pat to sit down, which
she did. After some conversation, 62 Rusk pulled Pat by the arms
to the bed and began to undress her. At Rusk's request, Pat
parties offered radically different accounts of what transpired on the night in
question. The court concluded that "the victim had consented to a session of kissing
and heavy petting with M.T.S." but did not consent to sexual intercourse. Id. at
1269. The court reinstated the conviction of second degree assault, refusing to define
physical force in relation to the resistance offered. Id. at 1275. Requiring an
unequivocal expression to end the encounter, the court pointed out, would "import
into the sexual assault statute the notion that an assault occurs only if the victim's
will is overcome, and thus to reintroduce the requirement of non-consent and
victim-resistance as a constituent material element of the crime." Id. at 1279. Thus,
the court ultimately held that permission is the consent necessary to negate the
physical force implicit in sexual intercourse and the absence of such permission
constitutes rape. Id.; see DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 33.04, at 583-84 (explaining
that the court in M.T.S. essentially held that without affirmative and freely given
permission, any force used in sexual intercourse justifies a forcible rape
prosecution); SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 96 (commenting that M.T.S. has the
practical effect of eliminating force as a requirement of rape and making nonconsent
the central component).
57 SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 32-33.
58 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).
59 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).
60 Id. at 721.
61 Id. Rusk then walked to Pat's side of the car, opened the door and said, "Now,
will you come up?" Id.
62 Id. at 722. After Rusk talked for a few minutes, he left the room for one to
five minutes. Id. Pat sat there without making a noise and made no attempt to
leave. Id. When he returned, Pat asked if she could leave, but Rusk, still holding her
car keys, told her that he wanted her to stay. Id.
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finished undressing herself and Rusk. Pat begged Rusk to let
her leave, but he continued to refuse. Pat testified that she was
scared and asked: "'If I do what you want, will you let me go
without killing me?' "63 At that point she started to cry and he
put his hands on her throat and lightly choked her. Again she
asked, "'If I do what you want, will you let me go?' "64 Rusk
replied that he would. Rusk and Pat had oral sex and vaginal
65
intercourse. Afterwards Rusk allowed Pat to leave.
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals reinstated a
conviction of second degree rape, 66 it was a four-to-three decision,
which rested on the actual force used by Rusk when he lightly
choked Pat.67 A strongly worded dissenting opinion, however,
clearly illustrates that attitudes did not change as much as
reformers would have liked: "She must follow the natural
instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere
words, the violation of her person by a stranger or an unwelcome
68
friend."
In Alston, the North Carolina Supreme Court set aside a
rape conviction, reasoning that while there was "unequivocal"
evidence of non-consent, the victim did not resist physically, and
the defendant did not specifically threaten her at the moment of
intercourse. 69 Alston and the victim, Cottie, had been involved
in a consensual sexual, yet abusive, relationship for six months.
About a month after Cottie left Alston, 70 he went to Cottie's
school to speak with her. 71 After blocking Cottie's path, Alston
asked her where she was living, but she refused to tell him. He
then grabbed her arm and they walked towards the parking lot.
Cottie told Alston that if he would let her go she would walk with
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.

66 A jury had found Rusk guilty of second degree rape, but the court of special
appeals, sitting en banc, reversed. Id. at 720-21.
67 Id. at 728.
68 Id. at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting). But see Bryden, supra note 34, at 361
(questioning the merit of discussing Rusk since in the end the conviction was
reinstated). Between the trial court, court of special appeals, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals, twenty-one judges considered this case. See Estrich, supra note
54, at 1112-13. Of the twenty-one judges, ten voted to convict Rusk and eleven to
acquit. Id. at 1113.
69 State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475-76 (N.C. 1984).
70 Cottie eventually left Alston after he hit her for refusing to give him money.
Id. at 471.
71 Id. at 471-72.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:603

him, which he did. Cottie testified that she did not run because
she was afraid of him. As they walked, Alston threatened to "fix"
Cottie's face and told her that she was going to miss class that
day. They walked to the house of Alston's friend. Once they
were inside, Alston asked if she was ready to have sex. Cottie
refused. 72 Alston then started undressing Cottie but she pulled
her pants back up. Again, Alston took her pants and blouse off
and they had sexual intercourse, while Cottie remained passive
and cried. A few days later, Cottie and Alston had sex again at
73
which time she did not fight him off.
The court concluded that the threats Alston made while he
and Cottie were walking were unrelated to the actual
intercourse. While Cottie may have had a justifiable "general
fear" of Alston, it was not sufficient to meet the standard of force
required to convict for rape. 74 Once again, the court decided that
the victim did not use sufficient resistance based on the degree of
force employed by the defendant.
Throughout the battle to improve rape laws, the main focus
remained on the defendant's actions, the actus reus, with little
mention of the defendant's state of mind, the mens rea. 75 Even
the most progressive rape statutes made no reference to a mens
rea element. 76 As a result, the focus remained on the victim, as
evidenced by Rusk and Alston.7 7 Instead of contemplating the
72

Id.

at 472. On prior occasions, Cottie and Alston had gone to the house to

have sex. Id.
73 Id. at 472-73. Cottie testified that during this last encounter Alston had
threatened to kick her door down unless she let him inside. Id. After Cottie let
Alston in, he began kissing her and performing sexual acts on her but she did not
fight him off because she was enjoying it. Id.
74 Id. at 476.
75 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 39 (noting that reformers remained
focused on the physical violence aspect of rape).
76 The Michigan statute led the way to gender-neutral language and the
removal of the resistance inquiry, instead focusing on the conduct of the defendant.
POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 34, at 6; see also ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 81
(referring to the Michigan statute as the "model feminist reform statute" because it
was addressed to "actors" and "victims" instead of "men" and "women"). In order to
remain focused on the defendant's conduct alone, lack of consent is not a part of the
definition of rape in Michigan. POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 34, at 6-7; see
SCHULHOFER, supra note 16, at 31-32 (describing the Michigan statute as the "most
ambitious and detailed" of the reform efforts, though it remains focused on the force
concept).
77 See George E. Dix, Date Rape: Defining When 'No' Means 'No,' CONN. L.
TRIB., Apr. 12, 1993, at 22 (explaining that the major criticism of the emphasis on
force is that it "encourages prosecutions to focus upon the behavior of the victim
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sufficiency of the resistance offered by the victim, judges focused
their attention on whether a reasonable woman would have felt
threatened by the defendant. 78 Both resistance and threat of
force were poor substitutes for examining the defendant's state
of mind. 79 Criminal laws are based on the premise that the
defendant has a culpable state of mind, yet that requirement is
not addressed in one of the most serious offenses. 80
The
approach that states have taken when prosecuting rape has been
detrimental to both victims and defendants.8 '
II.

RAPE LAW IN NEW YORK

A.

People v. Evans: A First Glimpse into Mens Rea
While force is an essential ingredient to rape, mens rea is
equally important. New York seemed to recognize this fact, at
least in dicta, as far back as 1975.2 In People v. Evans,8 3 the
court emphasized that in rape prosecutions it is the defendant's
state of mind that is controlling and must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.8 4 In that case, Evans approached the victim
rather than on that of the accused").
78 See State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 726-27 (Md. 1981); Commonwealth v.
Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 232-33 (Mass. 1982). The force must be sufficient to
overcome the victim's resistance or the threat of force must be sufficient to prevent
the victim from resisting. Additionally, the victim's fear must be reasonable in order
to justify the lack of resistance. Id.
79 See generally Estrich, supra note 54, at 1098-99 (opining that the
requirements of force and resistance function as a substitute for mens rea).
80 See Dix, supra note 77 (criticizing the lack of inquiry into a defendant's state
of mind when being prosecuted for a serious crime, such as rape).
81 By focusing on the force requirement, courts have essentially retained the
resistance requirement notwithstanding the express language in rape statutes. See
supra text accompanying note 49. Using the force-resistance rationale, while
ignoring the issue of mens rea, has immunized those defendants whose victims are
too afraid to resist and leaves unprotected those defendants who did not possess a
culpable state of mind. See Estrich, supra note 54, at 1101, 1117 (declaring that the
resistance test may result in a finding that the blameworthy man is innocent and
the man who did not realize that the woman was overcome by fear is guilty).
82 See generally Kinports, supra note 25, at 784-87 (observing that People v.
Evans was one of the most well known decisions to recognize the importance of a
mens rea element in a rape prosecution). But see ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 68-69
(criticizing the decision in People v. Evans for dismissing the threat posed by the
defendant even in the absence of threatening words or actions).
83 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), affd, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 768 (1st Dep't
1976). People v.Evans was a bench decision as the defendant waived his right to a
jury trial. Id. at 914.
84 Id. at 921.
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under the pretense that he was a psychologist conducting a
sociological experiment and convinced her to go with him.8 5 He
lured her up to an apartment, claiming it was his office, wherein
he pulled the victim onto an open sofa bed and attempted to
undress her.8 6 When the victim resisted his attempts, Evans
explained that it was all part of the experiment. Evans then
made several statements causing the victim to become
frightened: "Look where you are. You are in the apartment of a
strange man ....
I could kill you. I could rape you. I could hurt
you physically."8 7
Subsequently, several acts of sexual
intercourse took place.88
Ultimately, the court found the
defendant innocent of rape, but stressed the importance of
inquiring into the defendant's state of mind:8 9 "It is [the
defendant's] intent when he acts, his intent when he speaks,
which must.., be controlling." 90 The court never expressly
stated the actus reus to which the intent should attach, but
85 Id. at 915-16. The victim, a 20-year-old girl from North Carolina, accepted a
ride with the defendant to Manhattan. Id. at 915. On the way to Grand Central
Station, Evans persuaded the victim to go to the West Side to pick up his car. Id. at
915-16. Instead of picking up his automobile, Evans convinced the victim to
accompany him to an apartment, which he explained was one of his offices. Id. at
916. In reality, the apartment belonged to an individual who was out of the country
at the time. Id.
86 Id. As the defendant disrobed the victim, she would pull her clothes back on
until she was completely dressed again. Id.
87 Id. at 917. The court noted that the defendant did not hit the victim or
display any weapons. Id. Evans did yell and scream in order to intimidate the
victim. Id. He then played on her sympathy by telling her a story of his lost love who
committed suicide. Id. The victim, obviously touched by the story, reached out for
the defendant. Id. Evans then grabbed the victim and said: "You're mine, you are
mine." Id.
88 Id. The court pointed out that victim offered little resistance during the
actual intercourse and did not have any cuts, bruises, or torn clothing. Id. While the
court did find the victim's testimony credible, it concluded that what she described
constituted seduction, not rape. Id. at 918-19.
89 Id. at 920-21. The court struggled with determining how much of a threat is
required to constitute force. Id. at 920. The real issue, the court stated, was whether
the threats made by the defendant rendered resistance useless under the
circumstances-a question, the court held, for the trier of fact. Id. Furthermore, it is
the defendant's state of mind that controls, not the victim's perception. Id. at 92021.
90 Id. at 921. Although the court acknowledged that the victim could have
reasonably interpreted Evan's words as threats, the victim's perception was not
dispositive. Id. at 920-21. It was the defendant's intent that was controlling, and
since his words were "ambiguous," the court could not find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant intended to use threat of force to overcome the victim's
will. Id. at 921.
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implicit in its reasoning was that the requisite intent applied to
the use of force or threat of force to overcome the victim's will.91
Unfortunately, the court combined this progressive concept with
a convoluted interpretation of the defendant's threats. 9 2 The
mens rea requirement espoused in Evans did little to change the
law in New York. 93 Both the statute and subsequent decisions
94
remained focused on forcible compulsion.
B.

The CurrentStatute in Practice

New York Penal Law section 130.35 defines rape in the first
degree as "sexual intercourse ... [b]y forcible compulsion." 95
"Forcible compulsion" is defined in a previous provision as either
the "(a) use of physical force; or (b) a threat, express or implied,
which places a person in fear of immediate death or physical
injury to himself, herself or another person" as a means to
compel. 96 A separate section of the statue adds lack of consent as
an element: "Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element
of every offense defined in this article. . . that the sexual act was
committed without consent of the victim." 97 Furthermore, the
statute explains that lack of consent is proven when "forcible
compulsion" is shown. 98 In the final analysis, New York is left

91 Id.
92 At the time Evans was decided, New York's rape statute still included the
requirement of "earnest resistance." In addition, the defining amendment, which
sought to soften the stringent requirements, did not come until 1977, two years
after Evans. See supra text accompanying note 50. Despite the actual holding, the
Evans decision was quite revolutionary in that it looked beyond the victim's
resistance to the defendant's state of mind. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21. This is
not to suggest agreement with the decision or the court's interpretation of the
defendant's words. Nonetheless, considering the 1975 version of the rape statute
and the precedent surrounding the issue, the court's diversion into a mens rea
discussion represents a glimmer of hope that judges may some day be able to focus
their attention on the defendant's state of mind rather than on the victim's actions.
93 See Kinports, supra note 25, at 787 (indicating that Evans was a "short-lived
exception to the courts' general tendency to completely ignore the question of mens
rea").
94 While some cases made mention of a mens rea element, they did not engage
in an analysis of the defendant's state of mind. See, e.g., People v. Fenton, 563
N.Y.S.2d 522, 523 (3d Dep't 1990) (explaining, without citing Evans, that "[wihile
intent is clearly an element of rape in the first degree, we find that the element of
intent is implicit in the element of forcible compulsion").
95 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney Supp. 2002).
96 Id. § 130.00(8).
97 Id. § 130.05(1).
98 Id. § 130.05(2)(a).
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with a confusing statute that essentially requires sexual
intercourse, forcible compulsion, and lack of consent, with lack of
consent being presumed once forcible compulsion is proven.
Clearly, there is no mens rea element in the text of New
York's rape statute. That does not mean, however, that rape is a
strict liability crime. 99 When there is no express mens rea
element in a statute, the New York Penal Law explains that "a
culpable mental state may nevertheless be required... if the
proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental
state."10 0 In 1993, the New York Court of Appeals spoke to this
issue for the first and only time in a rape prosecution. 1 1 In
People v. Williams, the court explained that although the statute
is silent as to a mens rea element, "intent is implicitly an
element" of the crime. 10 2 Expounding upon this, the court stated
that the intent applies to the actus reus, that is, "the intent to
forcibly compel another to engage in intercourse or sodomy." 10 3
A few sentences later, the court cancelled out the mens rea it
had previously implied by concluding that if forcible compulsion
is used, the defendant must have known that the victim was an
unwilling participant. 104 Thus, the prosecution need only prove
99There is a strong presumption against strict liability when a statute is silent,
especially when the offense is serious and carries a severe penalty. See People v.
Hager, 476 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1984) ("What is certain is
that the principle of statutory construction is one that requires, emphasizes and
insists that intent be engrafted upon every element of the offense unless the intent
to limit is patently clear."); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 11.01[B], at 144
(noting the presumption against strict liability and setting forth factors that may
overcome the presumption). In addition, the statute explains that unless there is a
clear "legislative intent to impose strict liability," the offense "should be construed
as defining a crime of mental culpability." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney
1998). As the crime of rape is a codification of the common law offense, which was a
general intent crime not a strict liability offense, there is no such clear legislative
intent. See generally supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the holding in
People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1993), that intent to perform the
prohibited act is the mens rea of New York's rape statute).
100 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2).
101 See Williams, 614 N.E.2d at 736.

Id.
Id.
104 Id. at 736-37. The court was evaluating whether the jury charge adequately
conveyed that the defendants acted with the necessary mens rea. Id. at 736. The
jury charge did not mention a mens rea term, nor did it mention that the
defendants' state of mind was a consideration. Id. The court found that the trial
court did not commit reversible error in declining to instruct as to the mens rea. Id.
at 737. The court explained, "[Tihe jury, by finding that defendants used forcible
compulsion to coerce the victim to engage in sodomy and intercourse, necessarily
102

103
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the actus reus element and it will have necessarily proven the
mens rea of intent as well because "[m]anifestly, it is
unnecessary to forcibly compel another to engage in sexual acts
10 5
unless that person is an unwilling participant."
The dissent points out the illogical conclusions reached by
the majority. 0 6 One such conclusion resulted by "blending and
blurring" the concepts of actus reus and mens rea. 10 7 The
majority allowed the mens rea of intent to be subsumed and
proven by the actus reus of forcible compulsion. 0 8 Another
problem with the court's conclusions was its finding that the
trial court did not commit reversible error when it declined to
instruct the jury on the mens rea component of the crime. 10 9 If,
as the court stated, intent is an element of the crime, the jury
should have been instructed as to this element. 10 It seems as
though the Williams court could not have reasonably expected
intent to be an element of this crime given that it allowed the
newly introduced requirement to be subsumed in its definition of
actus reus. In addition, the court disregarded the trial court's
substantial omission in not instructing the jury on the mens rea
element, which clearly eliminated any consideration of the
defendant's state of mind from the jury's deliberations.
C.

The Implications of People v. Williams

There are two possible interpretations of the decision
rendered in Williams. One would allow for an unreasonable
found that defendants believed the victim did not consent to the sexual activity." Id.
at 736-37.
105 Id. at 736.
106 Id. at 737-38 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Judge Bellacosa initially, in an
unhelpful diversion, discussed the general intent/specific intent dichotomy. Id. at
737. He then pointed out the flaws with the decision of the court. Id. at 737-39.
107 Id. at 738 (pointing out that forcible compulsion is part of the actus reus of
an offense and intent is a mens rea term).
108 See id. (noting that the majority did not engage in sound legal analysis).
109Judge Bellacosa expressed concern about the jury's understanding of such
concepts even with an instruction, not to mention no instruction at all. Id. A
culpable state of mind is an essential element of an offense and yet the majority
allowed the jury to render a verdict without mentioning the concept. See id.
110It is essential that jury instructions include every element of a crime. See id.
at 737 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (noting that every element of an offense must be
included to provide guidance in jury deliberations). If the court expected the jury to
follow the instructions it gave regarding the other elements of the crime, then it
must have realized that the defendants' state of mind was not considered in the
jury's deliberations.
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mistake of fact defense and the other, as alluded to above, would
essentially abolish the mens rea requirement. Under the first
interpretation, and as suggested by the court in Williams, a
mens rea of intent to forcibly compel would be implied."' Since
a mens rea term usually applies to each essential element of the
crime, 112 in New York, intent would seem to modify both the
force and lack of consent components of the statute. 113 In
applying these principles, a problem arises when a mistake of
fact defense is raised. 1 4 In New York, a mistake of fact must
negate the requisite mens rea to constitute a valid defense. 115
Therefore, to establish a valid defense, a defendant would have
to show a mistake as to the force used and as to his
understanding of the victim's consent, sufficient to negate the
intent. As a result, a mistake of fact defense in New York can be
reasonable or unreasonable as long as it negates the mens rea.116
Implying a mens rea of intent into the rape statute would
allow for an unacceptable result in situations where the
defendant claims mistake of fact. The facts, as set forth above,
surrounding Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan support
this conclusion. 117 Although the House of Lords found Morgan
M'See id.

at 736.

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(1) (McKinney 1998) (providing that the mens
rea is "presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its
application clearly appears"); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 10.05, at 135
(explaining that the grammatical structure of the statute often dictates which
elements the mens rea modifies).
113See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
114 See Bryden, supra note 34, at 325 (observing that the mens rea issue usually
arises when the defendant claims a mistake of fact).
I's A person is relieved of criminal liability when he engages in conduct under a
mistaken belief of fact if"[s]uch factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state
required for the commission of an offense." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(1)(a) (McKinney
1998).
116 At common law, mistake of fact as to a specific intent offense was a defense
if it negated the mens rea. See DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 12.03[AJ, at 153.
Therefore, the mistake could be reasonable or unreasonable as long as it was an
honest mistake. See id. § 12.03[C], at 155. If it was a general intent offense, the
mistake of fact had to be reasonable in order to constitute a valid defense. See id.
§ 12.03[DI[1]. As a practical matter, this permits punishment on the basis of
negligence since a reasonable person would not have made the same mistake. See
id. at 156. Since modern statutes no longer follow the general intent/specific intent
dichotomy, the result is the same as it was at common law with a specific intent
offense-mistake of facts need only be honestly believed. See id. § 12.03[A], at 153
(noting that modern codes typically include a mens rea element).
117 Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, 2 All E.R. 347 (H.L. 1975); see supra
notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
112
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and his codefendants guilty of rape, it ruled that an honest
mistake pertaining to the victim's consent could act to negate the
mens rea, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable or
unreasonable."1
The court reasoned, however, that it would
have been impossible for a jury to find that the defendants
honestly believed that Mrs. Morgan was consenting to sexual
intercourse and, therefore, upheld the conviction. 119 While the
court's final holding is not especially controversial, its rationale
caused quite a stir 120 and illustrates why a mens rea of intent,
allowing both an unreasonable and reasonable mistake of fact, is
improper.
The other possible interpretation of mens rea in New York,
as suggested by the Williams majority, is that it is unnecessary
to instruct on the issue of mens rea because it is impossible for a
person to forcibly compel a willing participant to engage in
sexual acts.' 21 Essentially, the court eliminated the mens rea
requirement by allowing it to be proven through the actus
reus. 122 This application of Williams treats consent as a strict
liability element 123 and allows courts to deal with rape as they
always have, by focusing on the forcible compulsion component.
The court's error in concluding that it is impossible to forcibly
compel a willing participant to engage in sexual intercourse
becomes more evident when considering People v. Jovanovic.124
The Williams court implied that a situation could never arise
where a person forcibly compels a willing participant into sex;125
2 All E.R. at 347.
119 Id. at 353-62; see supra note 15.
120 See Alexander, supra note 15, at 227 (noting that the Morgan decision
118 Morgan,

created severe negative reactions both inside and outside of England).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
122 See the discussion of Judge Bellacosa's dissent supra text accompanying
notes 107-108.
123 When an element of a crime is deemed to be strict liability, neither a
reasonable nor an unreasonable mistake of fact is a defense. See DRESSLER, supra
note 19, § 12.03[B], at 154 ("Under no circumstances does a person's mistake of fact
negate his criminal responsibility for violating a strict-liability offense."). Several
jurisdictions treat consent as a strict liability element of rape, thereby refusing to
instruct on the defense of mistake. See Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570,
575 (Mass. 1989) (holding that defendant was not entitled to a mistake of fact
charge); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(same); Brown v. State, 207 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1973) (finding that it was not
error to refuse to instruct on the mens rea of rape since intent to have intercourse
by force and against the victim's will is not an element-of the crime).
124 700 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1st Dep't 1999).
125 People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1993).
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however, as the situation between Oliver and Jane illustrates,
such a situation is possible. 126 The situation in Morgan,
although more difficult to believe, is another example where a
defendant intentionally used forcible compulsion to have
intercourse with what the defendant thought was a willing
participant. 127 Thus, both Jovanovic and Morgan are clear
examples of the flawed reasoning in Williams, and demonstrate
the need for this issue to be revisited, either by case law or
statute.
III. PROPOSAL FOR RAPE IN THE FIRST DEGREE
It is unlikely that New York's rape law will be reformed
through case law, as Williams has been the only court of appeals
case reviewing the issue of mens rea. It is necessary, therefore,
to revise the statute. This Note proposes that rape in the first
degree build off the newly added offense to rape in the third
degree. In February 2001, section 130.05(2)(d) became effective
and created a new crime under the existing offense of rape in the
third degree. 128 The new offense provides that lack of consent
results when, at the time of the act, "the victim clearly expressed
that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a
reasonable person in the actor's situation would have understood
such person's words and acts as an expression of lack of consent
to such act under all the circumstances." 129 A combination of
this provision and the current first-degree rape offense would
create a statute that contains both a mens rea and an actus reus
element. Although this proposal allows for a reasonable mistake
of fact defense, which is beneficial for defendants, it also
concentrates on the defendant's state of mind, which decreases
the focus placed on the victims.

126 See
127 See
128 See
129 Id.

supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(d) (McKinney 2002).
(emphasis added). This added section covers the situation in which the
defendant did not use any physical force and there is no overt sign of threat, but
where the victim clearly and unequivocally said or intimated "no," thereby making
it clear to any reasonable person in the defendant's situation. Under this provision,
the defendant in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz would have most likely been found
guilty of rape in the third degree. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161,
1164 (Pa. 1994) (concluding that while the fact that the victim said "no throughout
the encounter" is "relevant to the issue of consent, it is not relevant to the issue of
force").
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The following represents a proposal for the crime of rape in
the first degree:
A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when he or she
engages in sexual intercourse with another person while
intentionally using physical force or threat, express or implied,
which places a person in fear of immediate death or physical
injury to himself, herself, or another person, or in fear that he,
she or another person will immediately be kidnapped and is
negligent as to the victim's lack of consent, such that a
reasonable person in the actor's situation would have
understood the victim's words and acts as an expression of lack
of consent to sexual intercourse. 130 It is a defense to such
offense that the actor made a reasonable mistake of fact as to
the victim's lack of consent.
While this proposal requires proof of intentional use of force,
typically, this will not be difficult to show. 13 1 Essentially, the
only difference between the proposed rape in the first degree and
section 130.03(2)(d) is the element of force. Thus, if a defendant
intentionally uses force while engaging in sexual intercourse and
disregards the victim's words or actions-actions which would
lead a reasonable person in the defendant's situation to believe
130 Although there is a hesitancy to use a mens rea of negligence in the
statutory definition of a serious offense, the thought behind the proposed statute is
that if a defendant is intentionally using force while engaging in sexual intercourse
the actor is involved in a high risk activity. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 19,
§ 10.04[D][2][a], at 128-29 (noting that negligence is a controversial mens rea
standard because the defendant is punished for lacking the state of mind of a
reasonable person). Therefore, the actor is on notice that the participant may be
unwilling and if the actor is unreasonable in his or her understanding of the victim's
words or actions, the actor will be held accountable.
The reasonable person standard proposed is similar to the existing standard in
New York associated with the justification of self-defense. The defense of
justification is set forth in New York Penal Law section 35.15 and uses the language
"reasonably believes." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1998). Unlike the
proposed statute, the self-defense provision does not explain how the standard
should be applied. In 1986, however, the court of appeals traced the legislative
history of the statute and set forth the standards to be considered. See People v.
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 48-52 (N.Y. 1986). The court rejected a wholly subjective
interpretation of the term "reasonably" as defying the ordinary meaning of the term
and retained an objective element. Id. Basically, the court set forth a standard that
rested on a determination of what a reasonable objective man would do in light of
the circumstances facing a defendant in his subjective situation. Id. at 52. This Note
proposes the same standard in relation to whether the defendant was reasonable in
understanding the victim's words and actions.
131 See generally Estrich, supra note 54, at 1096 (asserting that it is "difficult to
imagine an accidental or mistaken use of force").
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that the victim was an unwilling participant-the defendant
would be guilty of rape in the first degree.
The proposed statute differs from most rape statutes in its
use of negligence and its allowance of a reasonable mistake of
fact defense. Acquittal based on a reasonable mistake, even
though the victim may not have actually consented, is supported
by the fact that the defendant did not have the requisite culpable
state of mind. 132 In essence, by finding the mistake to be
reasonable, the jury is stating that any ordinary person in the
defendant's situation could have made the same mistake and
society does not want to punish such a mistake. But why punish
a person who has made an honest yet unreasonable mistake-a
person who has acted negligently? 133 When a person deviates
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have
exercised, and at the same time is involved in a high-risk activity
where the potential harm is so great, he must be held
accountable. 134 In a first-degree rape situation, the defendant
will have intentionally used physical force or threat of force,
132 See DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 12.03[D] [1], at 156 (explaining that if the
defendant's mistake regarding the victim's consent is reasonable, then he is not
guilty of the offense because his "state of mind... was nonculpable").
133 Dressler points out that punishing a defendant for an unreasonable, yet
honestly believed mistake, is unfair because it treats the defendant in the same
manner as an "intentional wrongdoer." Id. "For example, a male who genuinely, but
unreasonably, believes that a female is consenting to intercourse will be convicted of
the same degree of offense... as one who has full knowledge that he is acting
against the will of the victim." Id.
The proposed statute first requires an intentional use of force, therefore, there is
some sense of awareness on the part of the defendant that the activity he is
participating in is risky. As such, the arguments that might hold true in a rape
situation that does not involve force, beyond that which is necessary for sexual
intercourse, do not apply. In addition, a defendant who did not use forcible
compulsion, but is convicted because he unreasonably believed the victim consented,
is guilty of third-degree rape which carries a sentence as little as probation and up
to four years. Conversely, first-degree rape carries with it a sentence of five to
twenty-five years, a significantly harsher penalty. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2),
(3) (McKinney & Supp. 2002).
134 See DRESSLER, supra note 19, § 10.04[2] [a], at 128-29 (noting that when a
person "deviate[s] from a standard of care that a reasonable person would have
observed" he has acted negligently and is punished for failing to act as a reasonable
person would have acted). Dressler lists three factors helpful in determining
whether a person has acted reasonably: "(1) the gravity of harm that foreseeably
[sic] would result from the defendant's conduct; (2) the probability of such harm
occurring; and (3) the burden to the defendant of desisting from the risky
conduct .. " Id at 129; see also Byrnes, supra note 20, at 295 (opining that in a
society that insists on reasonable behavior, honest yet unreasonable mistakes are
intolerable).
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thereby placing him in a high-risk activity. Once in that
situation, the defendant is on notice that he may be held
accountable for acting unreasonably. 135 The harm that could
result if the defendant proceeds while the victim is an unwilling
participant is tremendous and, therefore, punishment is
justified.
A defendant would not be able to raise the mistake of fact
defense simply based on a he said/she said scenario. There
needs to be evidence that creates a middle ground from which
the defendant can argue that he reasonably misinterpreted the
victim's conduct. For instance, if the defendant claims that the
victim actually initiated sexual contact and was an active
participant, while the victim alleges the defendant hit her, tore
her clothes off, and threatened to hurt her if she did not comply,
there is no "equivocal conduct." 136 Each scenario, if believed,
would not leave any room for misinterpretation; thus, a mistake
of fact defense would not be appropriate here.
If it is determined that a mistake of fact defense is
appropriate, the question of whether the defendant reasonably
interpreted the victim's words or conduct is a question of fact, in
most cases, for the jury. As seen with People v. Goetz, 13v there
are dangers associated with leaving that final decision to a jury,
but it is hoped that a majority of the time the jury will reach the
proper decision.
Ultimately, the jury acquitted Goetz of
attempted murder; 138 however, the New York Court of Appeals
set forth factors a jury should consider when determining
whether a defendant acted reasonably. 139 While reasonableness
is determined using an objective standard, relevant background
information need not be ignored. This allows consideration of
any relevant knowledge the defendant had about the victim,
prior experiences the defendant had which could provide a
reasonable basis of belief, and physical attributes of the
135 See supra note 130.
136 See People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 966 (Cal. 1992). California has
adopted a reasonable mistake of fact defense similar to the one proposed in this
note. See id. at 967.
137 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
138 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 471 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that a jury

comprised of eight men and four women, ten of whom were white and two of whom
were African-American, acquitted Goetz of all charges except possession of a
concealed weapon, for which he served eight months).
139 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 52.
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parties. 140 The jury would combine the subjective attributes with
an objective standard to determine whether the defendant acted
reasonably.
To demonstrate how this proposed statute would work,
consider the factual scenarios posed by Jovanovic and Morgan.
In Jovanovic, the defendant admitted to intentionally using
physical force while engaging in sexual intercourse,' 4 ' satisfying
the first part of the definition. The real analysis will take place
with the defendant's state of mind in relation to the victim's
consent. Oliver had received a number of e-mails and on-line
instant messages from the victim describing her interest in S/M
and more importantly her interest in exploring such activities
with him.142 This case presents evidence of equivocal conduct
that Oliver could reasonably have misinterpreted; therefore, the
defense would be appropriate. When presented with all of the
correspondence between Oliver and Jane, the trier of fact would
have to determine whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's situation would have understood Jane's words and
conduct, at the time of intercourse, as conveying a lack of
consent to such acts. While this is ultimately up to the trier of
fact, it seems probable that given all the defendant knew of the
victim and all that she told the defendant she wanted to do with
him, 143 a reasonable person would have understood Jane's words
and actions to mean that she was a willing participant.
Regardless of the outcome, the proposed statute would allow
Oliver to present the defense to the jury, an opportunity that is
not likely under the current statute. 144
Similarly, in Morgan, the defendants admittedly used
forcible compulsion to drag Mrs Morgan out of bed and to take
turns having sexual intercourse with her. 145 Therefore, the first
140 Id. at 52-53. While Goetz involved self-defense for attempted murder, these
factors are helpful in a reasonable mistake of fact defense for rape. Id.
141 People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 162 (1st Dep't 1999) (describing how
the defendant tied the victim's arms and legs to the frame of the futon).
142 See id. at 163-64.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
144 Jovanovic would arguably still be guilty of "Forcible touching" a class A
misdemeanor pursuant to section 130.52 of the penal law. N.Y. Penal Law
§ 130.52(2) (McKinney 2002). Section 130.52 provides: "A person is guilty of forcible
touching when such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly
touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person ...for the purpose of
gratifying the actor's sexual desire." Id.
145 See supra text accompanying note 13.
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prong of the proposed statute, intentional use of force, is
satisfied. As for the defendants' state of mind, the three
defendants claimed that they believed the victim was a willing
participant because Mr. Morgan advised them that Mrs. Morgan
would resist in order to get "turned on," 14 6 making a mistake of
fact defense appropriate for the trier of fact to consider. Once
again, the trier of fact would have to determine whether a
reasonable person in the defendants' situations would have
understood Mrs. Morgan's words and conduct, at the time of
intercourse, 147 to convey a lack of consent to such acts. The
question to be answered by the trier of fact is whether it is
reasonable for men, who have been told by a woman's husband
that she is kinky and will resist but actually enjoys it, to
understand the victim's pleas of help to her young children to
call the police as an indication that she was not willing to
participate in the sexual acts. It is probable that the trier of fact
would find that, even considering what Mr. Morgan told the
three defendants, it was unreasonable for them to think that
Mrs. Morgan was consenting. Therefore, the defendants would
be guilty of rape in the first degree. Jovanovic and Morgan are
extreme and rare cases, but cases nonetheless. It seems that
even with the difficult cases, the proposed statute would allow
juries and judges to reach the "right" decision.
CONCLUSION
While the law surrounding the crime of rape has evolved
significantly since the common law, it is still in need of reform.
Specifically, the offense of rape needs to comport with other
serious crimes by providing for both a mens rea and an actus
reus element. In Williams, the New York Court of Appeals
seemed to create such a mens rea requirement, only to abandon
it later in the decision by defining the mens rea within the actus
reus of forcible compulsion. Williams left New York essentially
where it was, focused on forcible compulsion and thus on the
victim. By revising the rape statute to include a mens rea
element the focus will shift from the victim's actions to the
defendant's state of mind. As previous reforms in legislation
have indicated, revising a statute will not miraculously change
146
147

See supra text accompanying note 12.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
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societal attitudes towards rape; however, this proposed revision
expressly allows, for the first time, the trier of fact to concentrate
on the defendant's state of mind in a rape prosecution.
Hopefully, such a change in the rape statute will bring about
more successful prosecutions
when the defendant is
blameworthy and allow for an appropriate defense when the
defendant made a reasonable mistake of fact.

